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Perhaps the simplest and most complete description of the cerebral cortex is that it is a
sensorimotor controller whose primary purpose is to represent stimuli and movements,
and adaptively control the mapping between them. However, in order to think, the cerebral
cortex has to generate patterns of neuronal activity that encode abstract, generalized
information independently of ongoing sensorimotor events. A critical question confronting
cognitive systems neuroscience at present therefore is how neural signals encoding
abstract information emerge within the sensorimotor control networks of the brain. In
this review, we approach that question in the context of the neural representation of
space in posterior parietal cortex of non-human primates. We describe evidence indicating
that parietal cortex generates a hierarchy of spatial representations with three basic
levels: including (1) sensorimotor signals that are tightly coupled to stimuli or movements,
(2) sensorimotor signals modified in strength or timing to mediate cognition (examples
include attention, working memory, and decision-processing), as well as (3) signals that
encode frankly abstract spatial information (such as spatial relationships or categories)
generalizing across a wide diversity of specific stimulus conditions. Here we summarize
the evidence for this hierarchy, and consider data showing that signals at higher levels
derive from signals at lower levels. That in turn could help characterize neural mechanisms
that derive a capacity for abstraction from sensorimotor experience.
Keywords: spatial cognition, spatial attention, area 7a, LIP, parietal cortex, object-centered, constructional apraxia,
navigation
INTRODUCTION
Human cognition, or in colloquial terms, thinking, is notoriously
difficult to define. However defined, thinking has to be a prop-
erty of neurons, and it might be possible to infer several basic and
simple features of the neural mechanisms responsible without a
final or complete description of the cognitive processes them-
selves. For example, it seems impossible to provide any biological
account for thinking without patterns of activity in the cerebral
cortex exhibiting the property of sensorimotor independence.
That is, in order to think, the brain must be able to internally
generate a sequence of patterns of neuronal activity that encode
behaviorally useful information independently of concurrent sen-
sory or motor processing. Sensorimotor independence, as we will
refer to this property, seems a necessary starting point (without
which thoughts would be confined to the set of current stimuli
and actions). Second, it seems reasonable to assert that in many
primates (including humans) some forms of thinking, associ-
ated with the intelligent control of behavior, involve abstraction
(Miller, 2000; Tenenbaum et al., 2011). More specifically, the
brain has to be able to generate patterns of neuronal activity that
encode a particular type or class of information, best character-
ized by the property of generalizability. Neural signals engaged
in abstraction encode regularities, relationships, or principles of
general applicability that apply to a wide variety of particular sen-
sory or motor conditions, and that capability at the single neuron
level is likely to enable the brain to predict outcomes based on
principles applied in novel circumstances, one of the defining
central characteristics of intelligence.
The purpose of this review is to evaluate what we know
about abstraction and sensorimotor independence specifically as
it applies to the internal representation of space by neurons in the
posterior parietal cortex of non-humanprimates. Available exper-
imental evidence obtained from single neuron recording studies
in parietal cortex has documented a rich diversity of spatial rep-
resentations that should facilitate investigation into the neural
mechanisms by which abstraction and sensorimotor indepen-
dence are built on top of, or derive from, more basic sensorimotor
signals in the brain. For example, a long experimental history
has established the strong relationship between neural activity in
the parietal cortex and the representation of spatial information
that either derives from sensory input or that predicts forthcom-
ing movement. The relative importance of visual processing and
motor processing in parietal cortex has been debated for more
than 30 years (see below), but there seems some consensus that
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org January 2013 | Volume 6 | Article 112 | 1
INTEGRATIVE NEUROSCIENCE
Chafee and Crowe Sensorimotor independence of parietal activity
parietal cortex is interposed between sensory input and motor
output and is likely to play a role converting sensory represen-
tations into motor representations. Second, a number of recent
studies have shown that under certain circumstances, the same
neural architecture that mediates spatial sensorimotor control
is also capable of mediating spatial cognition. These data show
that when confronted by more complex spatial problems, (such
as those which require analyzing spatial relationships or com-
puting spatial categories, for example), parietal neurons exhibit
new forms of spatial representation more closely related to spatial
reasoning or spatial problem solving than spatial sensorimotor
control. Because spatial representations within parietal cortex
span the range from concrete sensorimotor to abstract cogni-
tive, parietal cortex offers a unique opportunity to gain insight
into one of the most basic questions in cognitive neuroscience:
how neural systems that perform a specific role in sensorimo-
tor control acquire the capacity for abstraction and sensorimotor
independence. The answer to that question is likely to lead to a
greater understanding of how human intelligence emerged within
a sensorimotor architecture such as the cerebral cortex.
The review is divided into four sections. The purpose of
the first three sections is to review the evidence that three
distinct types of neuronal signals coding spatial information
coexist within posterior parietal cortex that can be considered
to constitute the levels of a hierarchy of spatial representation.
(The hierarchy is defined by the nature of the spatial information
encoded at each level rather than then the neuronal populations
engaged, to acknowledge that single neurons can carry a mixture
of signals and participate at multiple levels of representation.) At
the first level (which we refer to as first order spatial coding), neu-
ral signals encode stimulus attributes and movement parameters,
and spatial processing faithfully reflects ongoing sensorimotor
control. This is exemplified by the familiar spatial tuning of single
neuron activity for stimulus position or movement direction, and
the population representation of these parameters (Mountcastle
et al., 1975, 1981; Georgopoulos et al., 1982, 1988; Andersen et al.,
1985; Schwartz et al., 1988), which together probably represent
the most behaviorally crucial forms of spatial representation
in the brain. At the second level (second order), the spatial
information coded by neural activity retains its dependence on
stimulus attributes (such as position) and movement parameters
(such as direction), so from a spatial perspective, activity does
not exhibit sensorimotor independence. However the duration
and intensity of these signals are modulated as a function of
cognitive factors. Working memory, attention, motor planning,
and decision-processing can all be characterized as instances of
second order spatial processes on that basis. At the top level,
neural activity encodes spatial information that exhibits com-
plete sensorimotor independence, in both temporal and spatial
domains. At this level, neurons carry signals that convey abstract,
generalized spatial information, such as spatial relationships
or spatial categories that generalize across numerous stimulus
configurations, and no longer pertain to specific stimuli or
movements. After considering the evidence that all three types
of spatial representation coexist in posterior parietal cortex, we
will address (see section “Origin of third order spatial representa-
tions”) how abstract spatial information encoded at upper levels
of this hierarchy might derive from transformations applied to
spatial information present at lower levels, and speculate as to
what the neural mechanisms that mediate interactions between
these levels of processing might be. The issue of how signals that
reflect more abstract forms of cognition emerge in sensorimotor
control networks (such as the posterior parietal cortex or the
cortex in general), perhaps as a consequence of sensorimotor
experience, is an important question, though relatively little is
presently known in terms of underlying neural mechanisms. We
hope that dissociating stages and types of spatial codes that exist
within parietal cortex may facilitate discovering more about how
they are generated by an interaction between the neural systems
of the cerebral cortex and a spatially structured environment.
FIRST ORDER SPATIAL CODING: SENSORIMOTOR CONTROL IN
POSTERIOR PARIETAL AREAS 7a AND LIP
We focus the review on experimental data obtained in two adja-
cent parietal subdivisions, area 7a, which is located in the pos-
terior part of the inferior parietal lobule, and area LIP, in the
lateral bank of the intraparietal sulcus. A number of studies inves-
tigating the neural mechanisms of spatial cognition in parietal
cortex in monkeys have focused on these two areas, providing a
good basis for a comparison between cognitive and sensorimotor
information processing within them.
Area 7a
Area 7a is located in the posterior aspect of the inferior parietal
gyrus in monkeys. Recent work in this area has focused on its role
in various forms of spatial cognition (attention, working mem-
ory, and more abstract processes), but its direct involvement in
basic visual processing, specifically spatial visual processing, has
been firmly established by prior research. (The role of area 7a
in motor processing is less well-understood). For the purpose of
establishing the coexistence of sensory and cognitive signals cod-
ing spatial information in this area, we briefly review some of the
evidence indicating involvement of area 7a in first order spatial
coding in the visual modality. The defining characteristic of the
visual sensory responsiveness of area 7a neurons is that neuronal
activity is tuned primarily with respect to the spatial attributes
of visual stimuli—where they are located on the retina and how
they are moving. Area 7a neurons can often be robustly driven
by visual stimuli independently of cognitive factors. The visual
receptive fields of 7a neurons are large and in many cases bilateral
(Blatt et al., 1990), and can be driven either by stationary visual
stimuli (Yin andMountcastle, 1977; Robinson et al., 1978; Motter
and Mountcastle, 1981; Mountcastle et al., 1981; Constantinidis
and Steinmetz, 2001a, 2005) or moving visual stimuli (Motter
et al., 1987; Steinmetz et al., 1987; Merchant et al., 2001, 2003,
2004a,b; Raffi and Siegel, 2007). Motion sensitive receptive fields
of area 7a neurons often exhibit a radial arrangement of pre-
ferred directions throughout their receptive field (Motter and
Mountcastle, 1981; Steinmetz et al., 1987), such that these neu-
rons are maximally activated by either expanding or contracting
patterns of optic flow (Siegel and Read, 1997; Merchant et al.,
2001, 2003; Raffi and Siegel, 2007), as occurs when the observer
moves through a fixed visual environment. It has been recently
noted that visual motion information in parietal area 7a could
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be used to derive the positions of visual landmarks and the loca-
tion of the observer with respect to those landmarks, a type of
spatial processing important for navigation and spatial orienta-
tion (Kravitz et al., 2011). Collectively these data indicate that
area 7a neurons carry a rich array of physiological signals encod-
ing spatial attributes of visual stimuli even under conditions (in
many cases) where those stimuli are passively presented and do
not have a direct behavioral or cognitive significance. As discussed
in subsequent sections these signals are frequently modulated by
cognitive factors, but cognitive processing per se is not a neces-
sary precondition for the activation of area 7a neurons by visual
stimuli.
Visual neurons in area 7a exhibit another characteristic that
provides substantial insight into the spatial functions of pari-
etal cortex in general. Many area 7a neurons exhibit gain fields
(Andersen and Mountcastle, 1983; Andersen et al., 1985, 1990b),
the term given to describe the influence of eye position on
visual sensitivity. These neurons possess visual receptive fields
that remain fixed in position in relation to the fovea, but the sensi-
tivity of the receptive field is a systematic function of the position
of the eyes in the orbits at the time that the visual stimulus is
delivered (Andersen andMountcastle, 1983; Andersen et al., 1985,
1990b). This provides an example of parietal neurons integrating
diverse types of sensory information to construct superordinate
spatial representations—body-centered spatial representations in
this case (Andersen, 1997)—which can then be used to direct
movement (Andersen and Buneo, 2002; Buneo and Andersen,
2006). The visual sensitivity of area 7a neurons is modulated
not just by eye position but by other postural factors, such as
the position of the head with respect to the environment, a
type of spatial tuning that could help to construct a “world-
centered” representation of space (Snyder et al., 1998b). Spatial
representations of this class, specifying the location of visual tar-
gets relative to the body, or the world, constructed by integrating
information that derives from the retina as well as a variety of
somatosensory sources, has direct utility for the visual control of
movement. From this perspective then, posterior parietal cortex
is a prototypical sensorimotor cortex.
Area LIP
The lateral intraparietal area (LIP) is located just medial to area
7a, in the lateral bank of the intraparietal sulcus. This area was
first identified on the basis of its particularly strong anatomical
connection with the frontal eye fields and the presence of neurons
with presaccadic activity (Andersen et al., 1990a). Subsequent
neural recording experiments have confirmed a role in saccade
control. Many LIP neurons are activated before the initiation of
saccades and their firing rate varies systematically as a function
of saccade direction (Barash et al., 1991). In the case that the
saccade is delayed for several seconds after the disappearance of
a visual target, LIP neurons maintain spatially selective activity
for the intervening working memory period until the saccade
is executed (Gnadt and Andersen, 1988; Chafee and Goldman-
Rakic, 1998). Although it can be problematic to dissociate visually
evoked activity from motor-related activity when movements are
made toward visual targets, (or to dissociate motor plans from
spatial attention under these circumstances), the activity of many
LIP neuronsmaintains a relationship to the direction of the forth-
coming saccade in double-step tasks in the case that no visual
stimulus appeared in the movement field of the neuron (Mazzoni
et al., 1996). This demonstrates that a visual stimulus is not nec-
essary for LIP neurons to exhibit spatially selective activity, as is
further indicated by the finding that LIP neurons are active before
memory-guided saccades to auditory stimuli (Stricanne et al.,
1996). Moreover, the activity of LIP neurons is frequently effector
specific, and is greater when monkeys plan and execute saccadic
eyemovements than when theymake reaching armmovements to
the same visual targets (Snyder et al., 1998a; Quian Quiroga et al.,
2006). Neurons in the parietal reach region (PRR) in the medial
bank of the intraparietal sulcus are likewise effector specific, but
are more strongly activated before armmovements than saccades.
Interestingly, neural activity in these two structures is modulated
as a function of which effector monkeys autonomously decided
to move to a cued spatial location under conditions in which they
randomized their choice of effector (Cui and Andersen, 2007).
Figure 1, taken from (Cui and Andersen, 2007), illustrates this
phenomenon. Following the initial visual transient, which was of
comparable magnitude regardless of the effector selected, activity
in the LIP neuron was higher on trials that the monkey decided
to make a saccade to the remembered target location (Figure 1A;
red trace), in comparison to when it decided to make a reach to
the same location (Figure 1A; green trace). Activity in the PRR
neuron exhibited the converse pattern, and was more strongly
active on trials that the monkey decided to make an arm move-
ment (Figure 1B; green trace) rather than a saccade (Figure 1B;
red trace). Because visual stimulation and attention are likely to
be comparable whether a monkey executes a saccade or a reach to
the same visual target, effector specificity argues that visual input
and attention alone cannot entirely account for the activity of LIP
(and PRR) neurons.
A selective relation between LIP activity and saccades is fur-
ther documented by the finding that these neurons are more
strongly driven by central cues that instruct saccades vs. reach-
ing arm movements, even in the case that the direction of the eye
movement is not known prior to the appearance of the central
cue (Dickinson et al., 2003). Spatial coding of saccade direction
in LIP is also modulated by eye and head position, suggesting
that LIP contributes to body-centered representations of space
(Snyder et al., 1998b), and there is evidence that this spatial rep-
resentation is three dimensional (Gnadt and Mays, 1995) and is
topographically organized (Blatt et al., 1990; Patel et al., 2010;
Savaki et al., 2010). Finally, it is possible to trigger saccades by
electrical microstimulation of area LIP (Thier and Andersen,
1998), though higher currents are typically required in compar-
ison to the frontal eye fields. A role for LIP in saccade control
is generally consistent with its connectional anatomy. LIP output
projections target saccade-related structures such as the frontal
eye fields (Cavada and Goldman-Rakic, 1989b; Blatt et al., 1990)
and the superior colliculus (Pare and Wurtz, 2001). The nature
of that role—whether to select visual targets or spatial locations
to guide downstream oculomotor structures or to provide an
explicit motor command itself—though, remains a point of con-
troversy. However, if an area codes spatial information that is
dedicated to a particular motor output pathway (such as one that
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FIGURE 1 | The activity of single neurons in the lateral intraparietal
(LIP) area and in the parietal reach region (PRR) during a task in which
monkeys autonomously decided to make a saccade or a reach toward
the same remembered visual target location. (A) After the initial visual
transient at the onset of the peripheral cue, activity in this LIP neuron is
greater during the following delay period on trials that the monkey decided
to make an eye movement (red trace) than an arm movement (green trace).
(B) Corresponding data in a PRR neuron. Activity in this case was greater
on trials that the monkey decided to make an arm movement relative to a
saccade. Reprinted with permission (Cui and Andersen, 2007).
controls saccadic eye movements), as the effector specificity of
LIP activity appears to suggest, then the distinction between these
alternatives becomes difficult to precisely define.
Although the above evidence indicates that neural activity in
area LIP relates to the direction of upcoming saccades, by the
same token, a substantial body of evidence indicates that saccade
control by itself cannot entirely explain the neural representation
of space in this area. Neurons in area LIP exhibit short-latency
ON responses that are tightly coupled to the appearance of visual
stimuli (Bisley et al., 2004), and respond to visual stimuli even
in the case that they do not serve as saccade targets (Colby
et al., 1996; Platt and Glimcher, 1997; Powell and Goldberg, 2000;
Gottlieb et al., 2005; Premereur et al., 2011). By comparing activ-
ity of LIP neurons when saccades are made toward and away
from visual targets (anti-saccades), it is possible to determine
whether the spatial selectivity of neurons is related to the posi-
tion of the visual stimulus or the direction of the forthcoming
eye movement. Under these circumstances, the activity of most
LIP neurons reflects the position of the visual stimulus serving as
the saccade target and not the direction of the pending saccade
(Gottlieb and Goldberg, 1999), although there is some evidence
that an initially stimulus-bound spatial signal in LIP converts
to a more closely saccade-bound signal as the delay period pro-
gresses, and the time of the pending saccade approaches (Zhang
and Barash, 2004; Gottlieb et al., 2005). All of these observations
indicate the presence of a visual representation in area LIP that
does not bear an obligatory relation to the direction of saccades.
In fact, LIP neurons can show selectivity for the shape of visual
stimuli (Sereno and Maunsell, 1998; Lehky and Sereno, 2007;
Janssen et al., 2008), a type of visual feature selectivity that shows
a role for LIP in visual processing that extends beyond saccade
control.
Although the precise balance of sensory and motor process-
ing in area LIP (and in parietal cortex in general) remains to
be determined, there seems little doubt, given that both factors
influence activity in posterior parietal cortex, that this area is
intrinsically sensorimotor cortex and, as a result, its function is
not entirely reducible to one side of this continuum (sensory or
motor) considered in isolation of the other. Additional evidence
(reviewed below), argues that these same parietal areas are able to
also participate in cognitive processes that to various degrees are
abstracted from sensorimotor control.
SECOND ORDER SPATIAL CODING: COGNITION AS MODULATION OF
THE TIMING AND STRENGTH OF SENSORIMOTOR SIGNALS
A brain confined to processing current sensory input and motor
output would be of limited intelligence. Human mental activity,
and its contribution to intelligent behavior, depends directly on
the capability of cortical systems to represent and process infor-
mation that is decoupled from sensorimotor control, both in time
and in information content. In this section, we consider how
relatively simple modifications of sensory and motor signals in
posterior parietal cortex can implement a diverse set of sophis-
ticated cognitive processes, including spatial attention, spatial
working memory, and decision-processing. The neural correlates
of each of these cognitive processes can be understood to emerge
by a modification of either the strength or timing of sensory
and motor signals in the brain. In each case however, the spatial
information coded by neural activity remains tightly coupled to
specific stimuli or movements.
Spatial working memory
The spatial delayed response task, which requires monkeys to
direct a motor response toward a cue or stimulus that was seen
in the recent past (but is not visible at the time of the motor
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response) is a classical test of spatial working memory in mon-
keys (Goldman-Rakic, 1988, 1995). An oculomotor variant of this
task (Funahashi et al., 1989), the memory-guided saccade task,
requires monkeys to make memory-guided saccades toward the
location of a brief visual target several seconds after it has dis-
appeared. During the performance of memory-guided saccades,
neurons in parietal area LIP are tonically activated for the interval
of time between the presentation of the visual stimulus and the
subsequent delayed saccade (Gnadt and Andersen, 1988; Chafee
and Goldman-Rakic, 1998). This neural activity appears to play a
role in spatial workingmemory, in the sense that it spans the delay
period between stimulus and response and is selective for the
spatial information needed to direct that response. Other groups
have shown that area 7a contributes to sensory-based spatial
working memory (Constantinidis and Steinmetz, 1996; Qi et al.,
2010; Rawley and Constantinidis, 2010). Delay activity in parietal
cortex observed on spatial working memory remains tightly cou-
pled to stimulus position or movement direction (identifying it as
a correlate of a first order spatial cognitive process by the defini-
tion above). Only the timing of neural activation with respect to
external sensorimotor events has changed.
Spatial attention
Much of the history of posterior parietal research over the last
35 years has been defined by the intention-attention debate, the
question as to whether the primary function of this cortical area is
to formulate motor plans (Mountcastle et al., 1975; Snyder et al.,
1998a, 2000; Quian Quiroga et al., 2006) or to allocate spatial
attention (Robinson et al., 1978; Bushnell et al., 1981; Gottlieb
et al., 1998; Bisley andGoldberg, 2003, 2006). The two alternatives
have proven to be extremely difficult to dissociate experimentally.
One reason is that themotor function of parietal neurons inmon-
keys has often been studied by having monkeys make movements
toward visual targets, which suddenly appear at unpredictable
locations, and as such are likely to draw bottom-up attention to
the stimulus. In addition, spatial attention and motor planning
may be functionally linked (Hoffman and Subramaniam, 1995;
Deubel and Schneider, 1996), a view articulated by the premo-
tor theory of attention (Rizzolatti et al., 1987). A role for parietal
cortex in spatial attention is clearly indicated by the observation
that patients with parietal lesions exhibit spatial neglect, a con-
dition in which they fail to consciously perceive stimuli delivered
contralateral to their damaged cortical hemisphere (Husain and
Nachev, 2007; Corbetta and Shulman, 2011).
Recordings in area 7a have provided evidence that neural activ-
ity in this area generates signals that specify where attention
should move. The visual responses of 7a neurons are suppressed
if attention is already located at the cells’ visual receptive field
when the stimulus appears, but are robust if attention is directed
elsewhere, a finding which could indicate that 7a neurons are
activated when the location of attention is shifted (Steinmetz
et al., 1994; Robinson et al., 1995; Constantinidis and Steinmetz,
2001b). A similar mechanism could account for the observation
that 7a neurons are activated to encode the location of salient
stimuli that pop-out form other stimuli in a visual array by
virtue of being visually distinct, and therefore drawing atten-
tion (Constantinidis and Steinmetz, 2001a, 2005). However, the
relation between attention and neural activity in area 7a is
complex, and dependent on training. For example, in monkeys
trained to base their responses on the position of a stimulus
defined in an external frame of reference (rather than the retinal
location of the stimulus), neural responses at attended locations
are enhanced rather than suppressed (Rawley and Constantinidis,
2010). These data indicate that the relation of neural activity to
attention in area 7a is plastic and could reflect the spatial coordi-
nate system the brain has been trained to employ (Chafee et al.,
2007), however the nature of task effects on attention-related
activity in area 7a is not yet fully understood.
In area LIP, neurons are activated by visual stimuli that appear
abruptly in their visual receptive fields even in the case that mon-
keys never make a saccade toward the stimulus (Gottlieb et al.,
1998; Kusunoki et al., 2000). Moreover, it appears that the abrupt
onset of the stimulus, and the potential capture of bottom-up
attention, accounts for a large part of the neural response, as
LIP neurons do not respond to the presence of identical stim-
uli brought into their receptive fields by a saccade (Gottlieb
et al., 1998; Kusunoki et al., 2000). The activity of LIP neu-
rons is reduced before saccades made without a visual target,
and is augmented if the visual stimulus is their receptive field is
made task-relevant (Gottlieb et al., 1998; Kusunoki et al., 2000).
Subsequent studies have shown that LIP neurons respond briskly
to visual events in their receptive fields that grab attention but
have no other behavioral significance in terms of instructing a
required motor response (Balan and Gottlieb, 2006). Figure 2,
taken from (Balan and Gottlieb, 2006), illustrates this effect in
LIP neurons studied during a covert visual search task. Population
activity functions plot the increase in firing rate of LIP neurons
when the stimulus in their visual receptive was briefly perturbed
(for example by shifting color or changing position slightly). Each
of these visual events had no bearing on the type or direction of
the requiredmotor response, yet each produced an increase in the
activity of LIP neurons. These data provide evidence that LIP neu-
rons can be driven by visually salient stimuli, regardless of their
motor significance. Conversely, the responses of LIP neurons to
visual stimuli are suppressed if those stimuli are overtly ignored
(Ipata et al., 2006). These and other data support the view that
area LIP generates a salience map of visual space (Goldberg et al.,
2006; Gottlieb, 2007).
To directly examine whether neural activity in LIP observed
during motor planning tasks may reflect the location of spatial
attention, Bisley and Goldberg presented a probe stimulus in the
middle of a memory-guided saccade trial, finding that attention
was located at the position of the saccade target, which was the
location coded by the concurrently active population of LIP neu-
rons (Bisley and Goldberg, 2003). These authors also found that
the tight correspondence between the location of spatial attention
and the location coded by neural activity in area LIP persisted
when attention was transiently drawn to a distractor stimulus,
even though this never served as the target for amovement (Bisley
and Goldberg, 2003).
Collectively, these data provide strong evidence that neural
activity in area LIP has a role in visual attention that can, with
experimental care, be dissociated frommotor planning. However,
the data do not seem to preclude that neural activity in LIP
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FIGURE 2 | Population activity in area LIP of monkeys performing a
covert visual search task using a stable stimulus array. Activity functions
plot the difference in mean LIP neuronal population firing rate when the
stimulus in the receptive field (RF) underwent a salient perturbation vs. when
it did not. Upward deflections indicate an increase in firing rate caused by the
salient visual event regardless of whether the search target was located inside
(“SAME-context”), or outside (“OPPOSITE-context”) the receptive field.
Visual perturbations included an increase (“INT+”), or decrease (“INT−“) in
stimulus intensity, a change in color (“COL”), a shift in stimulus position
(“MOVE”), or appearance of a bounding frame (“FRAME”). In each case, the
visual perturbation was task-irrelevant and had no bearing on response
selection. Reprinted with permission (Balan and Gottlieb, 2006).
provides spatial targeting information preferentially to the oculo-
motor system (via output projections to the frontal eye fields and
superior colliculus, for example). It seems likely, given the quan-
tity of evidence on both sides of the debate, that attention and
intention colocalize to posterior parietal cortex, and may repre-
sent two sides of one coin, in the sense that a spatial bias signal
originating in parietal cortex could simultaneously influence pro-
cessing in motor and sensory areas that receive parietal input
(Cavada and Goldman-Rakic, 1989a,b; Andersen et al., 1990a;
Wise et al., 1997; Marconi et al., 2001; Tanne-Gariepy et al., 2002)
albeit to different degrees depending on task conditions. If the
fundamental role of parietal cortex is to derive spatial information
from the sensory input and relay this spatial information tomotor
systems, it would seem advantageous if the spatial representation
were selective, restricted to the most salient or behaviorally rele-
vant stimuli, to prevent motor systems from being inundated with
more spatial targeting information than they could effectively
translate into movement at any given instant.
In all of the above studies, regardless of whether the neural
activity observed reflected a motor plan, a map of behavioral
salience, or a shift in covert attention, the spatial information
coded by that activity related directly to the position of a visual
stimulus or the direction of a forthcoming movement. In this
regard, spatial attention qualifies as a second order spatial process
by the definition above. The neural representation is a joint func-
tion of sensorimotor and cognitive factors, but the spatial content
of the neural representation maintains a close relationship to
stimulus position or movement direction. In these instances,
then, spatial cognition rests upon a neural mechanism that is only
partially decoupled from sensory processing or sensorimotor con-
trol. The neural correlate of spatial attention in this case consists
essentially of a variable gain imposed by a cognitive process on a
fundamentally sensory signal.
Spatial decision-processing
Neural recordings in posterior parietal cortex of monkeys during
decision-making tasks have provided crucial insight into the neu-
ral mechanisms involved, and in most of these studies, the neural
mechanisms of decision-processing have reflected a second order
spatial process as defined above. In one widely used paradigm,
monkeys make a decision to saccade in a particular direction
based the predominant direction of visual motion in a field of
moving dots. By systematically varying the proportion of dots
moving in the same direction, it is possible to produce motion
percepts of graded strength (Newsome et al., 1989). Under these
conditions, LIP neurons are more strongly active before saccades
in their preferred direction if the decision is based on a stronger
motion percept (Shadlen andNewsome, 1996, 2001; Roitman and
Shadlen, 2002; Churchland et al., 2008; Kiani and Shadlen, 2009).
This provides evidence that LIP activity scales with the confi-
dence or certainty of a spatial decision. Under a control condition
in which the dots move in random directions (and there is no
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coherent motion percept) monkeys saccade in variable directions.
The fact that LIP activity continues to predict saccade direction in
this case (Shadlen and Newsome, 1996) makes it difficult to inter-
pret the activity as reflecting visual salience or attention only, as
neural activity predicts the variable saccade direction over trials
in which the positions of visual targets and the features of the
motion stimulus do not vary. Subsequent studies have refined
our understanding of the neural mechanisms that mediate the
decision, providing evidence that LIP neurons integrate motion
information over time (Huk and Shadlen, 2005), and that once
activity in LIP reaches a boundary, the saccade is executed (Kiani
et al., 2008). In the most widely used version of the moving dot
perceptual decision task, the perceived direction of visual motion
(the perceptual decision), and the direction of the saccade (the
motor decision) are coupled, making it difficult to determine
whether neural activity reflected spatial aspects either of the stim-
ulus or the requiredmotor response. In a recent study dissociating
these two spatial variables, visual motion and saccade planning
directions independently modulated the activity of single LIP
neurons (Bennur and Gold, 2011), confirming a role for parietal
cortex in both visual and motor processing.
Rather than varying the strength of sensory evidence, other
studies of decision-making have systematically varied the mag-
nitude or probability of reward. This approach has successfully
demonstrated that increasing reward magnitude or probability
enhances the strength of saccade planning activity in LIP (Platt
and Glimcher, 1999). Subsequent studies simultaneously manip-
ulating both the strength of sensory evidence and the magnitude
of reward have shown that both factors influence motor planning
activity in LIP (Rorie et al., 2010). Under real world conditions,
decisions are often not dictated by explicit sensory cues, but rather
reflect varying estimates of action value based on past decisions
and outcomes. Under these conditions, neural activity in LIP
reflects a temporally local (and continuously varying) estimate
of action value (Sugrue et al., 2004). Neural activity showing
this relationship is illustrated in Figure 3. In this experiment, the
authors derived an estimate of the subjective value that mon-
keys assigned to alternative actions (the local fractional income)
which reflected howmuch rewardmonkeys had earned for a given
action in the recent past, and that accurately predicted their sub-
sequent choices. Activity functions in Figure 3 illustrate the firing
rate of a population of LIP neurons when their preferred sac-
cade was associated with different values. As the local fractional
income of the saccade target increased, the intensity of LIP activ-
ity increased also (Figure 3; blue activity functions of increasing
thickness). These data provide clear evidence that neural activ-
ity in LIP reflects not only saccade direction but also the value
attributed to the saccade.
Other studies have shown that LIP neurons are involved in
aspects of decision-processing that extend beyond the evalua-
tion and neural representation of action value. For example, in
monkeys adjusting their response strategy to beat a computer
opponent in a free-choice oculomotor game, LIP neurons encode
both the current value of alternative actions, as well as actions
and outcomes on prior trials, information that could play a role
in adjusting strategy to counteract the computer opponent (Seo
et al., 2009). Finally, the activity of LIP neurons bears a basic
relation to reward prediction, even when the reward is not a con-
sequence of a particular action. For example, neurons in this area
emit stronger responses to visual stimuli that signal the delivery
of reward relative to stimuli that do not, even when the location
of the stimulus does not bear any relation to the direction of the
saccadic response (Peck et al., 2009).
Scaling motor plans as a function of value or anticipated
reward could be expected to bias the competition among alter-
native motor plans in favor of the action with the highest payoff.
FIGURE 3 | Activity of LIP neurons scales with action value in a
decision-making task. Monkeys decided whether to saccade toward one of
two alternative targets (red or green) under conditions in which the reward
that each target would deliver changed dynamically as a function of choice
and reward history. Spike density functions plot the mean firing rate of 43
LIP neurons as a function of the local fractional income, or the proportion of
recently earned reward attributed to the color of the saccade target, that the
monkey selected. Activity when the monkey decided to saccade toward the
target in the receptive field is illustrated in blue, and to the target away from
the receptive field in green. Lines of increasing thickness indicate greater
fractional income associated with the selected target. Reprinted with
permission (Sugrue et al., 2004).
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This formulation of decision-processing bears a strong resem-
blance to the biased competition model of visual attention, in
which attention biases the competition between multiple stim-
ulus representations in favor of those which are most salient or
behaviorally relevant (Desimone and Duncan, 1995). The finding
that expected reward can also modulate visual signals in area LIP
(Peck et al., 2009), in addition to motor signals as indicated by the
above studies of decision-processing, suggests that visual atten-
tion and decision-processing may be mediated by similar neural
mechanisms (Gottlieb and Balan, 2010).
From the perspective of spatial sensorimotor independence,
the above studies characterize decision-processing as a second
order spatial process. The data show that LIP activity that codes
the direction of the next saccade is modulated in strength accord-
ing the predicted outcome or subjective value of an action.
However, the influence of reward or value-related cognitive vari-
ables on neural activity does not force the spatial representation
itself in LIP away from a tight relationship to the spatial aspects
of sensory input or motor output. More specifically, the spatial
information coded by neural activity in themajority of these stud-
ies continues to represent the spatial features of particular visual
stimuli (e.g., the position or direction ofmotion of visual stimuli),
or the spatial features of particular movements (e.g., the direction
of a planned saccade).
THIRD ORDER SPATIAL PROCESSING: DECOUPLING SPATIAL
REPRESENTATION FROM SENSORIMOTOR CONTROL
As indicated by the experimental findings reviewed above, a
rich variety of spatial cognitive operations can be achieved by
modulating the duration or intensity of neural signals that code
stimulus position or movement direction. In this section we will
consider the evidence that neural representations of space in pos-
terior parietal cortex can be decoupled from sensory and motor
processing to support more abstract forms of spatial cognition.
Our interest is to understand how spatial information which is
abstracted from sensory or motor processing is represented by
the activity of parietal neurons and is utilized to direct spatially
intelligent behavior. A rapidly growing body of evidence indi-
cates that posterior parietal neurons participate in a broad range
of functions that extends beyond the boundaries of spatial atten-
tion or sensorimotor control, to provide neural representations of
abstract cognitive variables such as numbers (Nieder and Miller,
2004), rules (Stoet and Snyder, 2004), categories (Freedman and
Assad, 2006; Goodwin et al., 2012; Swaminathan and Freedman,
2012), and time (Leon and Shadlen, 2003; Janssen and Shadlen,
2005). Here we will focus on studies providing evidence that the
computational capacity of parietal neurons extends to include
abstraction in the spatial domain, characterized by neural sig-
nals that code spatial information related to the solution of spatial
cognitive problems rather than spatial sensorimotor control.
Spatial representation during route traversal
One spatial cognitive task that generates abstract spatial represen-
tations in parietal cortex is the traversal of routes. Recent human
imaging studies have found that parietal cortex is activated when
subjects must navigate through an environment (Shelton and
Gabrieli, 2002; Rosenbaum et al., 2004;Wolbers et al., 2004; Spiers
and Maguire, 2007; Ciaramelli et al., 2010). This activity is often
characterized as reflecting spatial processing in egocentric coor-
dinates. In non-human animals, however, there is evidence to
indicate that parietal cortex may process higher-order informa-
tion during navigation. For example, single neurons in rat parietal
cortex have been shown to reflect a “route-centered” reference
frame (Nitz, 2006). These cells were activated in a similar man-
ner across different traversals of a particular route, independent of
the absolute spatial location or direction of motion. Similar neu-
rons have been recorded from medial parietal areas in monkeys
(Sato et al., 2006). These cells varied their activity across move-
ments of the same type in the same place, but which were part of
different routes. Further evidence of a non-egocentric represen-
tation of space was obtained in experiments in which lesions to
area 7a in cynomolgus monkeys resulted in impairments in the
traversal of whole-body mazes (Traverse and Latto, 1986; Barrow
and Latto, 1996). Monkeys with these lesions had difficulty using
information from visual cues to navigate. In one experiment,
some monkeys relied on the locations of visual cues to navigate
to the exit of the maze, while others learned a series of turns and
ran the same route regardless of where in the maze they started.
The area 7a lesions only affected those monkeys that used the
visual cues to navigate, suggesting that this area is involved in the
integration of visual landmarks in navigation.
Spatial representation during covert maze solution
Another realm in which spatial cognition is seen to be decou-
pled from stimulus and movement parameters is in the solution
of visual mazes. Behavioral studies of humans and monkeys fol-
lowing paths in mazes suggest a covert process that analyzes the
path, taking a longer time when the path is longer or has more
turns in it (Crowe et al., 2000; Chafee et al., 2002). This path-
tracking behavior is similar to the following of a route on a map,
which is itself a spatial operation related to navigation. Imaging
of human subjects who both navigated a 3-D virtual environ-
ment and viewed a top-down, or survey, view of the environment
showed that many brain areas, including superior parietal cortex,
were activated in both tasks (Shelton and Gabrieli, 2002).
Georgopoulos and colleagues (Crowe et al., 2004) recorded
from parietal area 7a neurons as monkeys mentally followed a
path within a maze displayed on a computer screen (Figure 4).
During this task, about one quarter of all cells recorded showed
activity that was tuned to direction of a straight path emanat-
ing from the center of the maze. An example of such a neuron
is shown in Figure 4A.
This tuned activity was related to the solution of the mazes in a
manner that was distinct from sensorimotor parameters. Neurons
recorded from a monkey that viewed and attended to maze
stimuli, but did not solve them, did not show tuning for path
direction. Additionally, data from visual and oculomotor control
trials showed a dissociation of neural activity during maze solu-
tion and sensory/motor processing. Of the cells that were tuned
in the maze task, three quarters were not tuned to the direction of
eye movements in a delayed saccade task, and the cells that were
tuned in both tasks had tuning functions that were not systemat-
ically aligned. Maze tuning was similarly dissociated from visual
stimuli in control tasks. Few maze-tuned neurons showed tuning
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FIGURE 4 | Directional tuning of a parietal neuron during maze
solution. (A) One maze stimulus was shown on each trial (mazes were 30◦
of visual angle across) centered on the gaze fixation target. Monkeys were
trained to indicate whether the path that emanated from the center of the
maze reached an exit or ended inside the maze. Only straight exit paths are
shown in this figure. Each raster shows the neural activity of an area 7a
neuron during trials in which the followed path pointed in the indicated
direction. (B) The direction of the path emanating from the center of each
maze indicates the preferred maze path of each cell. Gray ellipses indicate,
in the same spatial scale, the locations of each cell’s visual receptive
field, mapped with focal stimuli. Across the population, there was no
concordance between receptive field location and preferred maze path
direction.
during the cue period of the delayed saccade task, and locations
of independently mapped receptive fields were unrelated to pre-
ferredmaze directions (Figure 4B). Across the population of cells,
there was no systematic relation between the location of the visual
receptive fields and cells’ preferred maze directions, suggesting
single neurons could carry independent spatial signals under the
two different task contexts.
As a final indication that this neural activity reflected a spatial
cognitive process, Crowe and colleagues measured the direc-
tional tendency of the neuronal population over time during
maze solution (Crowe et al., 2005). In cases when monkeys
solved mazes with straight paths, the neuronal population vec-
tor (Georgopoulos et al., 1986) began pointing in the direction
of the path shortly after the maze was displayed, and remained
pointing in that direction over the course of the trial (Figure 5A).
In trials in which the monkeys solved mazes with a single right-
angle turn, the population vector rotated in the direction of the
turn (Figure 5B). This change in neural activity occurred in the
absence of any change in visual stimulation, and in the absence of
motor output.
Interestingly, the rotation of the population vector was char-
acterized by the subsequent activation of cells whose preferred
directions pointed in the direction of the initial maze direction,
and then of cells whose preferred directions pointed toward the
maze exit, at an angle of 45◦ defined with respect to the gaze
fixation target. There was no activation of cells with preferred
directions 90◦ from the initial path direction (which would be
predicted if the spatial signal in area 7a reflected the direction
of movement through a path with a 90◦ turn). This suggested
that the progression of the cognitive process following the path
through the maze could be related to the neural representation of
a vector with an origin that remained anchored at the fovea, and
a tip that moved progressively along the maze path from origin to
exit. These results, taken together, highlight the cognitive nature
of these spatial signals recorded from parietal cortex, and their
dissociation from sensory and motor parameters.
Spatial representation during object construction
Damage to the posterior parietal cortex disrupts spatial cogni-
tion, in addition to spatial attention and sensorimotor control.
Constructional apraxia provides an example of a spatial cognitive
disturbance seen after parietal damage that cannot be explained
purely in terms of a sensory or motor deficit. Patients with
this syndrome are unable to analyze and effectively reproduce
the spatial structure of objects when they attempt to draw or
assemble a copy of them. The copies they produce are spatially
disorganized—parts are omitted and the ones included are fre-
quently placed in the wrong positions relative to one another,
so that the constructed object is disarrayed. These spatial deficits
can be observed in patients that do not otherwise exhibit frank
visual or motor impairments (Piercy et al., 1960; Benton and
Fogel, 1962; Benton, 1967; Benson and Barton, 1970; Arena and
Gainotti, 1978), suggesting a specific deficit in spatial cognition.
The cognitive deficit underlying constructional impairment could
reflect a reduced ability to compute task-critical spatial relation-
ships, in that the spatial structure of an object is specified by
the set of spatial relationships that locate its parts with respect
to one another. As a set, these spatial relationships provide a
view-invariant representation of object structure that general-
izes across different object positions or orientations, and it seems
likely that to facilitate operations on objects, the brain generates
spatial representations of this type (Olson, 2003). Prior stud-
ies have shown that neurons in the supplementary eye fields
code saccade direction in object-centered coordinates (Olson and
Gettner, 1995, 1999; Olson and Tremblay, 2000; Tremblay et al.,
2002; Olson, 2003; Moorman and Olson, 2007a,b). However, the
existence of object-centered spatial coding in parietal cortex has
been debated. A prior study examined whether LIP neurons code
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FIGURE 5 | Dynamic neural activity during maze solution. (A) The lines to
the right of the maze indicate the length and direction of the population
vector, calculated every 10ms. This example shows the behavior of the
population vector during solution of mazes with straight paths that pointed
up. The population vector began growing in the direction of the maze by
about 200ms, and continued to point up throughout the trial. (B) When
monkeys solved mazes with a right-angle turn, the population vector first
pointed in the initial path direction and then rotated in the direction that the
path turned (positive values in the graph represent angles in the direction
the path turned, negative values represent angles away from the turn).
saccade direction in object-centered coordinates and reported
largely negative results (Sabes et al., 2002). Further, although pari-
etal lesions cause object-centered spatial neglect (Driver et al.,
1994; Tipper and Behrmann, 1996), the loss of fundamentally
retina-centered spatial representations could theoretically explain
this deficit (Driver and Pouget, 2000).
To study the neural correlates of cognitive operations involved
in the analysis of the spatial structure of objects, and to determine
if parietal neurons might support object-centered representations
of space, Georgopoulos and colleagues trained monkeys to per-
form an object construction task based on human clinical tests
of constructional ability and recorded neural activity in poste-
rior parietal area 7a during task performance (Chafee et al., 2005).
The sequence of task events is represented at the top of Figure 6.
Monkeys were presented with two objects each trial consisting of
an arrangement of squares. The first object was the model that
monkeys were required to copy. The second object was a partial
copy of the model, identical except that one square was miss-
ing. Monkeys had to compare the structure of model and copy
objects to locate the missing square in the copy object. They then
replaced the missing square to reproduce the model configuration
for reward. (Monkeys selected one of two sequentially presented
choice squares by timing when they pressed a single response key,
so movement direction did not vary over trials.)
Neural activity in area 7a varied systematically as a function of
the missing square in the copy object. This provided an example
of a case in which parietal activity coded a cognitive spatial vari-
able rather than a sensorimotor one because the task was designed
so that the location of the missing square did not correlate either
with the retinal position of a visual stimulus or the direction of
the required motor response. Rasters (Figures 6A–L) illustrate a
single area 7a neuron that was activated during the copy period
of the task (shaded vertical gray rectangle), but only on the sub-
set of trials in which the configurations of the model and copy
objects, taken together, jointly localized the missing square to the
lower left position within the copy object. The spatial informa-
tion coded by this neural activity did not derive directly from
the visual features of the objects (such as position or config-
uration). For example, the trials illustrated across the top row
(Figures 6A–D) all presented the same copy object at the same
position in the visual display, but neural activity clearly varied
as a function of where the monkey had determined the missing
square was located on each trial. Examination of the pattern of
activity across trial conditions demonstrates that activity in this
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FIGURE 6 | Event sequence of the object construction task and activity of
a single neuron in area 7a during task performance. Stimuli displayed
during the trial are shown in the top panel. Monkeys viewed a model followed
by a copy object (each consisting of an arrangement of squares). The copy
was identical to the preceding model except that a single square was missing.
Monkeys had to localize the missing square and replace it to reproduce the
model configuration for reward. Addition of a square to the copy was via a
forced choice. Two choice squares were presented and brightened in random
sequence. The monkey controlled which square was added by timing when it
pressed a single response key in relation to the choice sequence (the computer
added the square that was bright at the time of response to the copy object
automatically). (A–L) The duration of model and copy periods is delimited by
horizontal black bars at the top of each raster. This neuron was activated
primarily during the copy period, on trials in which the model and copy objects
presented jointly localized the single square missing from the copy object
(relative to the preceding model) to the middle left position within the object.
neuron was not an obligatory function of the configuration of the
model object shown earlier in the trial either. Nor did the spatial
information carried by the activity of this neuron bear a system-
atic relation to the direction of motor output (which did not
vary over trials). The activity of this neuron therefore appeared to
reflect a process more akin to spatial problem solving, than spatial
vision or sensorimotor control. The interpretation of this activity
as reflecting a cognitive analysis of object structure, rather than a
more basic spatial sensorimotor or attention process, is supported
by the observation that this neural population was generally not
activated when monkeys viewed, planned saccades, or directed
attention toward visual stimuli placed at the same locations the
cells preferred in the construction task (Chafee et al., 2005). The
minority of neurons active during both construction and control
tasks often exhibited different spatial tuning in the two contexts,
a pattern we had seen during visual maze solution (Figure 4B)
(Crowe et al., 2004).
To explore whether neurons in area 7a might code the location
of the missing square during the construction task in object-
centered coordinates, we randomly shifted the position of the
copy object to the left and right of the gaze fixation target (which
defined the center of viewer-centered spatial frameworks), and
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found that a large proportion of parietal neurons were insensitive
to this manipulation, coding the position of the missing square
relative to the object midline in an apparently view-independent
manner (Chafee et al., 2007). For example, the neuron illustrated
in Figure 7 was activated when the missing square was located on
the relative right (Figures 7B,D) and not the left (Figures 7A,C)
side of the copy object, regardless of whether the copy object itself
was presented in the left (Figures 7A,B) or right (Figures 7C,D)
side of viewer-centered space. We did find that the activity of
these neurons correlated with the location of covert spatial atten-
tion, as monkeys were faster to detect probe stimuli presented
unpredictably at the location of the missing square in the mid-
dle of a construction trial (Chafee et al., 2007), much the same
FIGURE 7 | Activity of a single area 7a neuron coding the location of
the missing square in the copy object in object-centered spatial
coordinates. The location of the missing square is indicated in light blue
but was not visible to the monkey (the copy object consisted only of an
inverted “T” configuration of dark blue squares in these trials). The copy
object was presented to the left (A,B) or right (C,D) of the gaze fixation
target at random over trials. The missing square was located on the relative
left (A,C) or right (B,D) side of the object, relative to its intrinsic midline, at
random over trials. Consequently, the object-centered and viewer-centered
side (left or right) of the missing square in the copy object were statistically
independent spatial variables. This neuron was activated whenever the
missing square was located on the relative right side of the copy object
(B,D), regardless of whether the copy object appeared in left (B) or right (D)
viewer-centered space.
way that LIP neurons were found to signal the location of atten-
tion during the performance of a memory-guided saccade task
(Bisley and Goldberg, 2003). However, the 7a neurons we studied
during object construction were not generically related to spa-
tial attention, as they failed to activate when monkeys directed
attention to the same locations in different task contexts (Chafee
et al., 2005). Finally, most of the neurons studied during con-
struction preferred locations on the contralateral side of objects
irrespective of the absolute locations of the objects (Chafee et al.,
2007). That contralateral bias at the neural population level
could potentially explain why object-centered neglect after uni-
lateral parietal damage typically involves the contralesional side
of objects (Olson, 2003).
Representation of spatial categories
Object-centered spatial codes provide an example of how neurons
can carry spatial information that generalizes across a potentially
infinite set of specific stimulus conditions, so long as the defin-
ing abstract feature, the spatial relationship (between a point in
space and an object) holds. Spatial categories (categories defined
on the basis of spatial information) are analogous in that they
similarly exemplify spatial regularities or underlying principles
that can be embedded in a potentially infinite set of different
stimulus configurations, and prior work has shown that parietal
neurons code spatial categories. For example, posterior parietal
neurons code categories of visual motion direction (Freedman
and Assad, 2006; Swaminathan and Freedman, 2012) and spatial
position (Merchant et al., 2011) in a dichotomous fashion when
these continuously varying stimulus attributes cross a learned
or inferred category boundary. The finding that parietal neu-
rons coded object-centered position (Figure 7) suggested they
might also code spatial categories based on spatial relation-
ships. To explore that possibility, monkeys were trained to place
a spot visual stimulus into a spatial category on the basis of
its spatial relationship to a line serving as a category bound-
ary. Stimuli were presented in a circular array, and the category
boundary bisected the array in either a vertical or horizontal
orientation (Figures 8A,B), instructing either a left/right cate-
gorization rule (LR rule), or an above/below categorization rule
(AB rule). This placed categorization under executive control.
Population activity in parietal area 7a reflected the assignment
of positions to categories in a rule-dependent manner (Goodwin
et al., 2012). One population of neurons exhibited activity that
dissociated left and right categories under the LR (Figure 8C) and
not the AB (Figure 8D) categorization rules. Another population
exhibited similar rule-dependent selectivity for vertical categories
(Figures 8E,F). Activity of this type was dissociated both from
the position of the stimulus and the orientation of the bound-
ary, as the rule-dependent category information coded by cells
was jointly defined by both factors taken together, and therefore
dissociated from either considered individually.
ORIGIN OF THIRD ORDER SPATIAL REPRESENTATIONS
One of the most important questions regarding the hierarchy of
spatial representation found in parietal cortex is how neural sig-
nals coding abstract spatial information (such as spatial categories
or relative positions) derive from simpler sensorimotor signals.
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FIGURE 8 | Neural population activity encoding categorical spatial
relationships in posterior parietal cortex area 7a. Monkeys performed a
task in which they assigned a spot sample stimulus to one of two spatial
categories on the basis of the spatial relationship between the sample and a
line serving as a category boundary. We presented the sample and category
boundary stimuli at different times in the trial, separated by an intervening
delay. The durations of the sample and boundary cue are indicated by
horizontal bars labeled “S” and “B,” respectively (C–F). Monkeys reported
their categorical judgment by pressing a response key when a subsequent
choice stimulus appeared in the same spatial category as the sample
(the time of onset of the first choice is labeled “C1”) (A,B). Circular array of
sample stimulus positions and category boundary shown bisecting the array
in either a vertical or horizontal orientation (the orientation of the boundary
varied over trials). A vertical boundary instructed the monkey to divide the
circular array of positions into the spatial categories left and right (LR rule).
A horizontal boundary instructed the monkey to divide the circular array of
positions into the spatial categories above and below (AB rule) (C,D). Activity
of a population of 27 parietal neurons coding the horizontal category of the
sample under the LR rule (C) and not the AB rule (D). Population activity is
plotted separately for trials in which the sample fell in the preferred (red) and
non-preferred (blue) horizontal category for each neuron, defined on the basis
of the position of the sample stimulus (E,F). Corresponding data for a distinct
population of 26 area 7a neurons coding the vertical categories above and
below under the AB rule (F) and not the LR rule (E).
The answer should provide insight, perhaps of general scope, into
how neural systems acquire the capacity for abstraction as a func-
tion of sensorimotor experience. In the practical context of most
neurophysiological experiments, this amounts to understanding
how abstract neural signals in the brain emerge as a function of
training to perform a particular behavioral paradigm. Cognitive
paradigms developed for monkeys are generally of a relatively
simple form; however they capture something fundamental to
more elaborate forms of cognition in humans. The brain has to
generate a set of cognitive representations that capture an implicit
principle of general applicability embedded in a set of superfi-
cially disparate stimuli or events. Neural signals coding spatial
categories provide one concrete example (Figure 8). The group-
ing criteria governing category membership, based on a spatial
relationship in this case, is the generalized principle, which could
be applied to categorize a potentially infinite set of exemplars.
Once these abstract representations emerge, the brain then has to
discover the correct mappings between sensory input, cognitive
signals, and motor commands.
We know comparatively little about the neural mechanisms
by which repeated experience with the world leads to the emer-
gence of cognitive neural signals in the cortex, and the capacity
for abstraction and prediction in novel circumstances that these
signals are likely to underlie. However, there is little doubt that
reward processing and reward-modulated synaptic plasticity play
an essential role, although the role of training may differ for
second and third order processes as defined above. For exam-
ple, there is interesting evidence that signals that reflect work-
ing memory (a second order process) in prefrontal cortex are
present in experimentally naïve animals before training (Meyer
et al., 2007), although the information encoded by this activ-
ity increases with training (Meyers et al., 2012). That suggests
that there exists, to a certain degree, a native working memory
capability continually operating in the background to effectively
buffer the sensory input regardless of its learned behavioral sig-
nificance. However, it seems equally like that most of the third
order cognitive signals described, such as those coding abstract
categories of experimental stimuli, or rules governing task con-
tingencies, did not pre-exist in the cortex of monkeys prior to
training. In fact there is evidence that training exerts a pow-
erful effect on category-selective neural signals both in parietal
(Freedman and Assad, 2006) and prefrontal (Freedman et al.,
2001; Cromer et al., 2010; Roy et al., 2010) cortex. To our
view, the fact that most third order spatial cognitive signals
so far described are likely to be “trained into” the brain does
not undercut the utility of this general experimental approach
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for studying the neural origins of abstraction at the single cell
level. We would argue that similar processes are taking place in
the human brain continuously, given that it is likely we learn
much of our abstract knowledge by interacting with a statisti-
cally structured environment (Tenenbaum et al., 2011), coupled
with reward history. Behavioral paradigms used to study neural
correlates of cognition in monkeys are formalizations of these
same features. To enable abstraction, neurons at higher levels
of the cortical processing hierarchy have to detect and extract
statistical regularities (perhaps relating to generalized principles
or “knowledge”) embedded in activity at lower levels, a process
that can be effectively modeled in the non-human primate. We
know that this process takes place, but how is one of the most
important unanswered question presently confronting cognitive
neuroscience.
The integration of statistical models of human cognition
(Tenenbaum et al., 2011), with theory-informed biological exper-
iments is likely to lead discovery of the neural mechanisms that
generate a capacity for abstraction in neural systems. From that
perspective, biological data that can test predictions based on
theory will be particularly important. Many models of human
cognitive processes can be probed to make predictions about
how information should flow between populations of neurons
that encode different types of behavioral or cognitive infor-
mation, as sensory inputs are transformed into more abstract
cognitive signals to control behavior, for example. We sought
evidence of this type of communication between simultaneously
active neural populations coding different types of information
in posterior parietal cortex. More specifically, we measured short-
term fluctuations in the amount of information about a spatial
location coded by two different populations of neurons that
were coactive in parietal cortex during the object construction
task. The first population coded the position of object squares
in a retinocentric, or viewer-centered framework, and there-
fore provided an example of a first order spatial representation.
The second population coded the position of object squares in
object-centered coordinates. Because object-centered positions
are intrinsically relational (and abstracted from specific abso-
lute positions), signals coding them constitute an example of
a third order spatial process. To measure interactions between
groups of neurons coding these two types of spatial informa-
tion, we first measured the firing rates of ensembles of neurons
coding position in viewer-centered and object-centered coordi-
nates that we had recorded simultaneously, and applied a pattern
classification analysis to these firing rates to quantify short-term
fluctuations in the strength of the signals coding space in the two
coordinate frames. We then employed Granger causality analy-
sis to examine the temporal correlation between the two time
series (after accounting for their autocorrelation). Using this
approach it was possible to determine that fluctuations in the
strength of the viewer-centered signal preceded and predicted
variation in the object-centered signal, but not the converse,
and only in the case that the groups of neurons representing
the two types of spatial information were recorded simultane-
ously (Crowe et al., 2008). That provided physiological evidence
that abstract neural representations at higher levels of the cor-
tical processing hierarchy receive input and derive from signals
at lower levels. We also found that viewer- and object-centered
representations of space exhibited markedly different population
dynamics. Viewer-centered position was represented by a pat-
tern of population activity that was relatively stable over time,
whereas object-centered position was represented by a pattern
of population activity that was continuously evolving and highly
dynamic, such that subsets of cells carrying the same spatial infor-
mation were briefly activated in rapid and repeatable sequence
throughout the trial (Crowe et al., 2010). These data suggest
that distinct neural mechanisms are employed to represent spa-
tial information at different levels of the hierarchy in parietal
cortex.
It is important to note that parietal neurons encode non-
spatial cognitive variables as well, and non-spatial information
can coexist with spatial sensorimotor information in the activ-
ity of single neurons (Gottlieb and Snyder, 2010). For example,
individual LIP neurons can encode both task rules and move-
ment direction (Stoet and Snyder, 2004), or can carry signals that
reflect task context and stimulus position (Balan and Gottlieb,
2006), often at different times in a single trial. This combina-
tion of signals in LIP neurons may bias the neural representation
of space to reflect cognitive factors or represent an interme-
diate step toward the generation of purely cognitive signals.
However, interestingly, inactivation of LIP neurons appears to
impair behavior primarily by interfering with spatial selection,
leaving the ability to modulate behavior according to non-spatial
cognitive factors relatively intact (Balan and Gottlieb, 2009). That
suggests that neural signals in LIP encoding non-spatial cog-
nitive factors may reflect top-down input from other cortical
structures.
The data reviewed above provides evidence that neural rep-
resentations of space that exhibit sensorimotor independence in
posterior parietal cortex (1) are mediated by context-sensitive sig-
nals distinct from those coding stimulus or motor parameters,
(2) still bear a relation to spatial attention (but not in a way dic-
tated directly by sensory input), (3) may emerge by virtue of a
transformation applied to population activity coding stimuli and
movements, and (4) appear to be mediated by population activity
that exhibits unique temporal dynamics.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Perhaps the single most fundamental fact to emerge from the
experimental evidence reviewed above is that posterior pari-
etal cortex sustains a hierarchy of spatial representations, which
exhibit different relations to behavior and appear to be medi-
ated by distinct neural mechanisms. One of the key dimensions
differentiating the levels of this representational hierarchy is sen-
sorimotor independence, the degree to which spatial information
coded by parietal neurons remains tightly coupled to stimulus
and motor parameters, vs. the degree to which spatial representa-
tions diverge from sensorimotor factors to mediate various forms
of spatial reasoning or problem solving that could be considered
to constitute instances of spatial intelligence. The long-standing
debate as to whether spatial signals carried by parietal neu-
rons reflect stimuli vs. movements, or visual attention vs. motor
intention, has produced compelling evidence in favor of both
conclusions, suggesting that these are not mutually exclusive.
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Even in the more abstract case that parietal neurons represent
spatial locations dictated entirely by cognitive rather than senso-
rimotor factors, neurons appear to continue to reflect the location
of spatial attention. From that perspective, biases in both sen-
sory and motor processing could be considered simultaneous
corollaries of spatial information represented in parietal cortex. A
critical question remaining is how abstract spatial representations
in parietal cortex are learned, or more specifically, what are the
neural mechanisms that derive them from lower level spatial sen-
sory and motor representations in this area. That question seems
experimentally approachable, and integration of experimental
and theoretical work stands to provide substantial insight into the
neural mechanisms involved.
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